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1INTEREST OF AMICI1
Amici are 56 professors and researchers of law and 
economics at universities throughout the United States. 
We have no personal interest in the outcome of this case, 
but a professional interest in seeing patent law develop 
in a way that encourages innovation and creativity as 
efficiently as possible.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) provides that a defendant in a patent 
case may be sued where the defendant is incorporated or 
has a regular and established place of business and has 
infringed the patent. This Court made clear in Fourco 
Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223 
(1957), that those were the only permissible venues for a 
patent case. But the Federal Circuit has rejected Fourco 
and the plain meaning of § 1400(b), instead permitting a 
patent plaintiff to file suit against a defendant anywhere 
there is personal jurisdiction over that defendant. The 
result has been rampant forum shopping, particularly 
by patent trolls. 44% of 2015 patent lawsuits were filed 
in a single district: the Eastern District of Texas, a 
forum with plaintiff-friendly rules and practices, and 
where few of the defendants are incorporated or have 
established places of business. And an estimated 86% of 
2015 patent cases were filed somewhere other than the 
jurisdictions specified in the statute. Colleen V. Chien & 
1.  No person other than the amici and their counsel participated 
in the writing of this brief or made a financial contribution to the 
brief. The parties have been given appropriate notice and have 
consented to the filing of this Brief.
2Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue, Santa Clara 
Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-1 (Sept. 
1, 2016), Table 3, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2834130. This Court should grant 
certiorari to review the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) 
because the Federal Circuit’s dubious interpretation of 
the statute plays an outsized and detrimental role, both 
legally and economically, in the patent system. 
ARGUMENT
I. The Federal Circuit’s Expansive and Incorrect 
Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) Allows 
Patentholders to Sue Anywhere in the Nation
Section 48 of the Judiciary Act of 1897 limited 
jurisdiction in patent cases to districts that the defendant 
inhabited or had a place of business and committed 
infringing acts. Act of March 3, 1897, c. 395, 29 Stat. 
695. In 1942, this Court confirmed that “Congress did 
not intend the Act of 1897 to dovetail with the general 
provisions relating to the venue of civil suits, but rather 
that it alone should control venue in patent infringement 
proceedings.” Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 
U.S. 561, 563 (1942). 
In 1948, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), 
specifying that “patent venue is proper in the judicial 
district where the defendant resides, or where the 
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has 
a regular and established place of business.” In 1957, 
this Court confirmed that patent venue should not be 
interpreted with reference to the general jurisdiction 
statute, holding that “28 U.S.C. 1400(b) . . . is the sole 
3and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent 
infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented 
by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1391(c).” Fourco Glass Co. 
v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223 (1957).
In 1990, the Federal Circuit declined to apply this 
Court’s longstanding precedent and decided that the 
general venue statute should define interpretation of the 
patent venue statute. It made this decision on the basis of 
a ministerial change Congress made in 1988 to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance 
Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990). That statutory 
language changed the wording in 28 U.S.C. § 1391, from 
defining residence “for venue purposes” to defining 
residence “for purposes of venue under this chapter.” 
There was no indication that Congress intended this 
change to impact the patent venue statute. 
The Federal Circuit’s conclusion that Congress’s 
ministerial change overruled this Court’s longstanding 
precedent is incorrect for at least two reasons. First, 
it violates fundamental rules of statutory construction. 
It is well-established that Congress “does not alter the 
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague 
terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, 
hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. American 
Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (citing MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 
231 (1994); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000)).
Second, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation renders 
the second half of § 1400(b) largely superfluous. That 
section provides:
4Any civil action for patent infringement may 
be brought in the judicial district where the 
defendant resides, or where the defendant 
has committed acts of infringement and has a 
regular and established place of business.
The term “resides” in § 1400(b) must mean something 
different than having “a regular and established place of 
business.” Otherwise, there would have been no reason 
to include both provisions in the venue statute, or to link 
them through the disjunctive term “or.” In Brunette, this 
Court, interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) as well as 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(d), confirmed that where a corporation “resides” 
is where it is incorporated. Brunette Mach. Works v. 
Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, n.2 (1972). 
Instead of parsing § 1400(b) carefully, the Federal 
Circuit has chosen to read the § 1391(c)(2) definition of 
corporate residence for general venue purposes into the 
specific patent venue provision. In relevant part, § 1391(c)
(2) provides that corporate defendants:
shall be deemed to reside . . . in any judicial 
district in which such defendant is subject to 
the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect 
to the civil action in question . . . .
For patent infringement cases, the relevant aspect 
of personal jurisdiction is typically specific jurisdiction, 
which focuses on whether the defendant’s suit-related 
conduct establishes a “substantial connection” with the 
judicial forum in question. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 
1121 (2014). But a corporation will have established a suit-
related “substantial connection” with, and thus be subject 
5to jurisdiction in, any district in which it “has committed 
acts of infringement and has a regular and established 
place of business.” So the Federal Circuit’s decision to 
read the § 1391(c) definition of “resid[ing]” into § 1400(b) 
renders the second half of the latter section superfluous 
as to corporations, a category which includes virtually all 
patent defendants. A judicial reading that renders half of 
a statutory provision superfluous is strongly disfavored. 
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 
2330 (2011) (“‘As our cases have noted in the past, we are 
hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional 
enactment which renders superfluous another portion of 
that same law.’” (quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection 
Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988))); Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 
515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995) (noting “[a] reluctance to treat 
statutory terms as surplusage”).
The Federal Circuit’s expansive, and we believe 
incorrect, interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) effectively 
allows patent owners to file suit in any federal district 
where an allegedly infringing product is sold. In re TC 
Heartland, LLC, No. 2016-105, at 10 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 29, 
2016) (holding that jurisdiction is proper in a patent suit 
“where a nonresident defendant purposefully shipped 
accused products into the forum through an established 
distribution channel and the cause of action for patent 
infringement was alleged to arise out of those activities”). 
The widespread availability of products over the internet 
means, in effect, that patentholders can bring their suits 
in any district in any state in the country.
6II. Permissive Venue has Fueled and Enabled Forum 
Shopping and Selling, Patent Trolls, and Case 
Concentration
The Federal Circuit’s expansive interpretation of 28 
U.S.C. §1400(b) has harmed the patent system in three 
distinct ways. It has led to forum selling and forum 
shopping, it has contributed to the growth of opportunistic 
patent litigation by patent trolls, and it has led to undue 
case concentration.
Patent lawyers today spend a great deal of time 
figuring out the best districts in which to file patent cases, 
and for good reason. The district in which you file your 
patent case has consequences for how much your case will 
cost, how long it will last, and whether you will prevail in 
court. Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 
38 AIPLA Q.J. 401 (2010); Brian J. Love & James C. 
Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent 
Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, Stan. Tech. 
L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2835799.
The choice of venue enabled by the Federal Circuit’s 
liberal interpretation of the statute has created an 
incentive for courts to differentiate themselves in order to 
compete for litigants and “sell” their forum to prospective 
plaintiffs. See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for 
Patent Cases, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 631 (2015); Daniel M. 
Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
241 (2016).
Among district courts, the Eastern District of Texas 
is the clear forum of choice for patent plaintiffs. It has 
7been the most popular venue for patent cases in eight of 
the last ten years. Chien & Risch, supra at 3. Whether 
intentionally or not, judges in the Eastern District of 
Texas have adopted rules and practices relating to case 
assignment, joinder, discovery, transfer, and summary 
judgment that attract patent plaintiffs to their district. 
Klerman & Reilly, supra; Matthew Sag, IP Litigation 
in U.S. District Courts: 1994-2014, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 
1065 (2016) (detailing evidence of “forum selling” and 
five advantages to plaintiffs of filing suit in the Eastern 
District of Texas). 
A study of all patent cases filed from 2014 to June 2016 
quantifies some of the advantages. Love & Yoon, supra. 
Compared to their colleagues across the nation, judges in 
the Eastern District of Texas take 150 additional days on 
average to rule on motions to transfer, id. at 15, and are 
10 percentage points less likely to stay the case in favor 
of an expert adjudication on the validity of the patent 
by Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in inter partes 
review, id. at 26., despite the fact that patents asserted 
in the Eastern District of Texas are challenged in inter 
partes review more often than patents asserted in any 
other district. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti Rai, & Jay 
Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and 
District Court Proceedings, 31 Berkeley Tech. Law J. 
45, 109 (2016). At the same time, judges in the Eastern 
District of Texas have adopted discovery rules that begin 
earlier, end sooner, and require broader disclosure than 
just about anywhere else in the country. Love and Yoon, 
supra at 19-22 (comparing discovery and other pretrial 
deadlines applicable in the Eastern District of Texas and 
District of Delaware). In combination, relatively early and 
broad discovery requirements and relatively late rulings 
8on motions to transfer ensure that defendants sued in the 
Eastern District of Texas will be forced to incur large 
discovery costs, regardless of the case’s connection to 
the venue.
However, not all types of plaintiffs choose to take 
advantage of the leverage that these rules and procedures 
make possible. Patent assertion entities (PAEs), or patent 
“trolls” use patents primarily to gain licensing fees 
rather than to commercialize or transfer technology. 
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The 
Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for 
the Patent System, 62 Hastings L.J. 297 (2010) Trolls 
make particular use of the advantages provided by the 
Federal Circuit’s permissive approach to forum shopping. 
Since 2014, over 90 percent of patent suits brought in the 
Eastern District of Texas were filed by trolls established 
for the purpose of litigating patent suits. Love & Yoon, 
supra at 9. By contrast, operating companies, individuals, 
and universities are more likely to sue in other districts. 
Chien & Risch, supra at 3-4, 40. 
The troll business model explains this difference in 
behavior. As the FTC’s recent report describes, “litigation 
PAEs” sign licenses that are “less than the lower bounds 
of early stage litigation costs,” a finding “consistent 
with nuisance litigation, in which defendant companies 
decide to settle based on the cost of litigation rather than 
the likelihood of their infringement.” Federal Trade 
Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC 
Study, https://www.ftc.gov/reports/patent-assertion-
entity-activity-ftc-study. Rather than a decision on the 
merits and damages commensurate with the value of 
patented technology, litigation PAEs instead seek to 
9leverage the high cost of litigation to coerce nuisance-
value settlements keyed not to the merits of the lawsuit, 
but the cost of litigation. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 Colum. L. 
Rev. 2117 (2013). Further, unlike operating companies that 
sell products, litigation PAEs generally lack customers 
and regular operations and therefore have the flexibility 
to incorporate and file suit based solely on litigation 
considerations, through shell companies or otherwise. 
While forum shopping in general impairs the operation 
of law, disadvantages those who lack the resources to 
engage in forum shopping, and creates economic waste, 
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1444, 1464-1465 (2010), the rise of the troll business model 
exacerbates these problems in patent litigation, creating 
a particularly urgent need for the Court to hear this case. 
This Court has previously warned against the problems 
of abusive patent litigation. More than a century ago, it 
worried about the rise of “a class of speculative schemers 
who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of 
improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented 
monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the 
industry of the country, without contributing anything 
to the real advancement of the arts.” Atlantic Works v. 
Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883). And in Commil v. Cisco, 
this Court said:
The Court is well aware that an “industry has 
developed in which firms use patents not as 
a basis for producing and selling goods but, 
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.” 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 
388, 396 (2006) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). 
10
Some companies may use patents as a sword to 
go after defendants for money, even when their 
claims are frivolous. 
576 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1920 (2015). 
Because troll suits now dominate patent litigation 
nationwide, their filing patterns have led to an overall 
concentration of 44% of all patent cases in the Eastern 
District of Texas in 2015. Among cases initiated 2014 
through 2016, one U.S. District Judge on the Eastern 
District of Texas—Judge Rodney Gilstrap of Marshall, 
Texas—was assigned almost one quarter of all patent 
case filings nationwide, more than the total number of 
patent cases assigned to all federal judges in California, 
New York, and Florida combined.2 
This level of concentration is a problem for the legal 
system whatever one thinks of the decisions of the Eastern 
District of Texas and regardless of how fair and capable 
the judges there are. Simply from a logistical standpoint, 
the current caseload in the Eastern District of Texas is 
problematic. If even 10 percent of the 1,686 patent cases 
assigned to Judge Gilstrap in 2015 go to trial, he will need 
to preside over three to four patent trials per week every 
week for an entire year to avoid creating a backlog. 
2.  According to Lex Machina, between January 1, 2014 and 
June 30, 2016 Judge Gilstrap was assigned 3,166 new patent suits, 
more than the combined total of all district courts in California, 
Florida, and New York: 2,656. Love & Yoon, supra, at 5 (collecting 
these statistics).
11
Further, when Congress decided to consolidate 
patent appeals in the newly-created United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, it deliberately chose 
to include both appeals from the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office and the district courts, so the new 
court would not hear only appeals from patent owners. 
And it considered and rejected proposals to create a 
specialized district court to hear patent cases. But the 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 1400(b) has in practice 
created just such a court.
The current distribution of patent litigation filings is 
the result of strategic behavior by a specific type of patent 
enforcer, not an artifact of proximity to the original locus 
of invention or alleged infringement. Forum-shopping 
plaintiffs will naturally gravitate towards whatever 
district seems to have the most favorable rules. The effect 
of the Federal Circuit’s decision to expand patent venue 
beyond the scope of the statute and this Court’s decisions 
has been to create a de-facto specialized patent trial 




The Federal Circuit’s permissive venue rule has 
fundamentally shaped the landscape of patent litigation 
in ways that harm the patent system, by enabling 
extensive forum shopping and forum selling, supporting 
opportunistic patent litigation by patent trolls, and 
creating undue case concentration. This Court should 
grant certiorari in order to curb abuse of venue based on 
its misinterpretation of § 1400(b).
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Counsel of Record 
Stanford Law SchooL 
559 Nathan Abbott Way 
Stanford, CA 94305 
(650) 723-4605
mlemley@law.stanford.edu
Counsel for Amici Curiae
Appendix
1a
Appendix  — List of signAtories1
Professor John R. Allison1 
McCombs Graduate School of Business,  
University of Texas at Austin
Professor Margo Bagley 
Emory Law School
Professor James Bessen 
Boston University School of Law
Professor Jeremy Bock 
University of Memphis Cecil Humphreys School of Law
Professor Daniel H. Brean 
University of Akron School of Law
Professor Michael A. Carrier 
Rutgers-Camden School of Law
Professor Michael W. Carroll 
American University Washington College of Law
Professor Bernard Chao 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law
Professor Tun-Jen Chiang 
George Mason University School of Law
1.  Institutions are listed for affiliation purposes only. All 
signatories are participating in their individual capacity, not on 
behalf of their institutions.
Appendix
2a
Professor Colleen V. Chien 
Santa Clara Law School
Professor Andrew Chin 
University of North Carolina School of Law
Professor Robert Cook-Deegan, MD 
Arizona State University School for the Future  
 of Innovation in Society
Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss 
NYU School of Law
Dr. Dieter Ernst 
East-West Center, Honolulu
Professor Samuel F. Ernst 
Fowler School of Law at Chapman University
Professor Robin C. Feldman 
Hastings College of the Law
Professor Lee Fleming 
University of California at Berkeley School  
 of Engineering
Professor Brian Frye 
University of Kentucky College of Law
Professor William Gallagher 
Golden Gate University Law School
Appendix
3a
Professor Shubha Ghosh 
University of Wisconsin Law School
Professor Eric Goldman 
Santa Clara University School of Law 
Professor Bronwyn H. Hall 
University of California at Berkeley  
 Department of Economics
Professor Yaniv Heled 
Georgia State University College of Law
Professor Christian Helmers 
Santa Clara University Economics Department
Professor Joachim Henkel 
Technische Universität München School of Management
Professor Susan Helper 
Case Western University Economics Department
Professor Tim Holbrook 
Emory University School of Law
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp  
University of Iowa College of Law
Professor William Hubbard 
University of Baltimore School of Law
Appendix
4a
Dr. Xavier Jaravel 
Stanford Economics Department
Professor Dennis S. Karjala 
Arizona State University College of Law
Professor Peter Lee 
UC Davis Law School
Professor Mark A. Lemley 
Stanford Law School
Professor David K. Levine 
Department of Economics,  
 Washington University in St. Louis
Professor David S. Levine  
Elon University School of Law
Professor Doug Lichtman 
UCLA Law School
Professor Yvette Joy Liebesman 
St. Louis University School of Law
Professor Orly Lobel 
University of San Diego School of Law
Professor Brian Love 
Santa Clara Law School
Appendix
5a
Professor Phil Malone  
Stanford Law School
Professor Michael J. Meurer 
Boston University School of Law
Dr. Shawn Miller 
Stanford Law School
Professor Matthew Mitchell  
University of Toronto
Professor Susan Barbieri Montgomery 
Northeastern University School of Law
Professor Sean Pager 
Michigan State University College of Law
Professor Arti K. Rai 
Duke Law School
Professor Jacob H. Rooksby  
Duquesne University School of Law
Professor Jorge R. Roig  
Charleston School of Law
Professor Matthew Sag 
Loyola University, Chicago School of Law




Ana Santos Rutschman 
DePaul University College of Law
Professor Lea Bishop Shaver 
Indiana University School of Law
Toshiko Takenaka 
University of Washington School of Law
Professor John L. Turner 
University of Georgia School of Business
Professor Jennifer Urban 
Berkeley Law School
Professor Eric von Hippel 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
 Sloan School of Management
